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Liability of local governments in respect of defective
buildings: A comment
M.K. BAlACHANDRAN

Dutton v. Bognar Regis Building Co. Ltd.l, is a land mark decision in tort given by
the Court of Appeal in England, for it is the first of a series of cases which sparked off
the judicial development of the law relating to the liability in tort of local authorities
for the negligent exercise of their statutory powers in respect of defective houses built
in contravention of building bye-Iaws.2 The decision is also significant, for it applied
the principle enunciated in Donoghue v. Stevenson3 to the owner of realtl and, for the
first time, held that an owner-builder would be liable for negligence for defects in the
building to a person who subsequently acquired it and that damages recoverable in
such cases would include not only damages for personal injury and property, but also
damage to the dwelling house itself.s
Before Dutton's case, during 1960s, there were decisions which established that
builders who were not owners were liable to persons who were injured in
consequence of defeCtive constructions6 on the basis of the principle laid down in
Donoghue v. Stevenson? But where builders were themselves owners, they were held
immune from liability for negligence, once t~ey had disposed of the houses by sale or

1.
2.

3,

4.
5.
6.

7.

(1972) 1 All ER 462 (CA).
The decision was explained and affirmed by the House of Lords in Anns v. London Borough of
Merton (1977) 2 All ER 492 (HL), elaborated and applied in Am'crest Ltd. v. W.S. Hattrell and
Partners (1982) 1 All ER 17 (CA) and followed in Dennis v. CharnH.'ood Borough Council (1982) 3
All ER486 (CA).
(1932) AC 562, Lord Atkin explained the new duty situation, thus: "A manufacturer of products,
which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in tht:
.form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with
the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up the products
will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take
reasonable care."
Lord Denning observed: "The distinction between chattels and real property is quite unsustainable.
If the manufacturer of an article is liable to a person- injured by his negligence, so should the
builder of a house be liable" (1972) 1 All ER 462 at pp. 471-472.
This view was accepted and applied in a number of subsequent cases, cr. Ann's case; Batty v.
Metropolitan Property Realizations Ltd. (1978) 2 All ER 445.
In Gallagher v. McDowell Ltd. (1961) NI 26, the court held that a contractor who built a house
negligently was liable to a person injured by his negligence. Similarly, in Sharpe v. E. T. Sweeting &
Son Lta. (1963) 2 AIl ER 455, the builder of a house for a local authority was held liable to the
tenant's wife, although the accident happened 8 years after the building was constructed.
(1932) AC 562.
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lease, on the older authorities of Bottomley v. Bannister8 and Otto v. Bolton and
Norris.9 This immunity, as was observed by the House of Lords later in Ann's case,lO
was based partly on the distinction made between chattels and real property, partly on
the principle of caveat emptor or, in the case where the owner leased out the property,
on the proposition that (fraud apart) there was no law against letting a 'tumble-down
house'. A lease or sale of a house is a contract between a lessor and a lessee or a
vendor and a pun;haser and the basic rule in such cases is the principle of caveat
emptoYor 'let the buyer beware' doctrine. The proposition that "(F)raud apart, there
is no law against letting a tumble-down house"/l seems to be based on the principle of
caveat emptor, as where the house is open to inspection and any -defect is known or
brought to the notice of the lessee/purchaser,
he cannot, at a later stage complain
against the lessor/vendor. Where the lessor discloses the defects to the lessee and
despite that if the lessee willingly decides to take the defective house, there is no law
which comes to his rescue. Similarly, in the case of sale where the purchaser
undertakes to make investigations of his own and the vendor does nothing to prevent
such investigations, the purchaser cannot afterward allege that the vendor made
misrepresentations
to him.12
Howevcr, the doctrine may not provide "as invincible a shield as sellers might
wish."l3 It will provide no protection to the seller where the seller misrepresents the
facts or conceals the defects or where the terms of the contract are contrary. It has no
application if the buyer does not have equal access to the information relating to the
defects, or if the seller is in a unique position to know the true facts, or if the seller
takes steps to obscure the truth or where the buyer is not in the same position as the
seller.14
In Dutton's case, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the distinction
between liability for chattels and liability for real property was unsustainable and that
a builder who created a hidden defect was not absolved from liability merely because
he was the owncr of the premises.
Referring to the distinction hitherto maintained between the liability of the
builders who were not owners and the liability of the builder-owners, Lord Denning
observed:
"There is no sense in maintaining this distinction. It would mean that a contractor
who builds a house on another's land is liable for negligence in constructing it;
but that a speculative builder, who buys land and himself builds houses on it fer
salc-and
is just as negligent as the contractor-is
not liable. That cannot be
right. Each must be under the same duty of care and to the same persons."15
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

(J 932) 1 KO 458 (Lease).

(1936) 1 All ER 960 (Sale); Gallagher's case expressly left open the question whether immunity
against action of builder-owner still survived.
Alllls V. LOlldoll Borough of Mertoll (1977) 2 All ER 492.
Robbins v. Jones (1863) 15 CONS 221.
SOli/hem DI?\'c1opment Co. v. Sill'a 125 U.S. 247 (1888).
"Sale of St1'llclllrally Defcctive Homes-The
Potential Liability of Sellers alld Real Estate Brokers",
Oklahama Law Revil?\<',Vol. 41 Fall, 1988, No.3.

Ibid.
(1972) 1 All ER 462 at pp. 471-472.
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In Dutton's case, the building bye-laws made by the Bognar Regis Urban District
Council ('the Council') under the Public Health Act, 1936 provided, inter alia, for the
inspection and approval of the foundations of buildings by the Council through its
inspectors before they were covered up. The builder in this case constructed a house
on a plot of land situated on an old rubbish tip without providing adequate
foundations as provided for under the bye-laws, after obtaining a certificate of
approval of the foundations by the building inspector of the Council. The inspector
failed to carry out his task properly, for if he had made a competent inspection, he
could have easily detected that the house was being built on a rubbish tip, and that, in
breach of the building bye-laws, the foundations were not strong enough to carry the
load of the house. The house after comp)etion was sold to C and C sold the house to
the plaintiff. Soon after the plaintiff moved to the house, due to subsidence caused by
inadequate foundations, 'the walls and ceilings cracked, the staircase slipped and the
doors and windows would not close'. The plaintiff brought an action against the
builder and against the Council for negligence, claiming damages.
The question fo: the Court of Appeal to decide was whether the Council was
liable for the damage caused by the building inspector's failure to carry out proper
inspection of the foundations.16 The majority held that there existed a dual liability of
the builder and the Council "as the builder would be liable for building the house
badly" and the Council "for passing the bad work".
As to the liability of the Council the court observed that the Council through its
building inspector, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff to ensure that the inspection of
the foundations of the house was properly carried out and that the foundations were
adequate. Since the primary object of the legislation (the building bye-laws) was to
protect purchasers from jerry buildings, the Council, the court held, should be liable
to purchasers for failure to carry out the responsibility which had been entrusted to
them under the law. Applying the principle of proximity and foreseeability of
Donoghue's case,17 the court observed that the relationship between the building
inspector and the plaintiff was sufficiently proximate to form the basis of a duty of
care, although the plaintiff was only a subsequent purchaser, since any defect in the
foundations once covered up could not be discovered by the purchaser as he would
have no opportunity of intermediate examination. The inspector ought to have had
the plaintiff in mind as someone likely to suffer damage if he was negligent in
inspecting and approving the foundations.
The Council argued that under the bye-laws, it merely had the power to examine
the foundations and therefore it could not be held liable for failing to exercise that
power and consequently it could not be held liable for failing to exercise the power
(by its inspector) with proper diligence. Rejecting the contention, the court pointed
16.

17.

The plaintirrs action against the builder was settled because it was accepted that on the older
authorities of Bottomley v. Bannister (1932) KB 458 and 0110 v. Bolton & No/Tis (1936) 1 All ER 960,
he was excmpt from liability for negligence.
The principle was explained by Lord Atkin thus: "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who then in
law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be, persons who are so closely and directly affccted by
my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation
as being so affected when I am
directing my mind to the acts or omissions whicn are called in question."

212

National Law School JOllmal

out that since the object of the bye-laws was to give the Council control over building
work, such control carried -withit a duty to enforce the bye-laws with reasonable care
by appointing competent inspectors for the purpose.
It was also pointed out by the court that even if all that the Council had was a
'mere power' (not a duty), still they would be liable for the negligent exercise of that
power as the negligence occurred in the course of a positive exercise of it. The
assumption of control over building operations by the making of bye-laws was a
positive act and thereafter any negligence in the exercise of their control could give
rise to liability; but for the failure to make a proper inspection, the damage could not
have occurred to the plaintiff, the court observed.
Finally, the Council submitted that its liability, in any case, would be limited to
those who suffered bodily harm and did not extend to those who only suffered
economic loss. Thus, although it might be liable if the ceiling fell down and injured a
visitor, it would not be liable simply because the house was diminished in value, the
Council argued. Rejecting the argument, the court pointed out that the damage done
was not solely economic loss but was physical damage to the house. It observed:
"If (Council's) submission were right, it would mean that, if the inspector
negligently passes the house as properly built and it collapses and injures a
person, the Council are liable; but if the owner discovers the defect in time to
repair it - and he does repair it - the Council are not liable. That is an
impossible distinction. They are liable in either case. I would say the same
about the manufacturer of an article. If he makes it negligently, with a latent
defect (so that it breaks to pieces and injures someone), he is undoubtedly
liable. Suppose that the defect is discovered in time to prevent the injury.
Surely he is liable for the cost of repair."18
The majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that the Council was liable to the
plaintiff for the damage caused by the breach of duty by its building inspector in
failing to carry out a proper inspection of the foundations and that the plaintiff was
not precluded from' recovering damages on the ground that the loss was solely
economic, because the damage to the house was physical damage and the plaintiff was
entitled to recover the cost of repairs.
The decision is unique in more than one respect. It is unique for holding the
local authorities liable in tort to a subsequent purchaser of a house built in
contravention of building bye-laws by a builder who is independent of the local
authority, even where the defects in the structure manifested itself years later. It is
also significant in holding the local authorities liable for damages arising out of the
non-exercisel9 or negligent exercise of its discretionary powers under the building byelaws. It is also important to note that the court held the Council liable for the physical
damage to the house resulting in the diminution of its value even when it did not
result in any harm to the person or other property of the occupier. In effect, the
18.
19.

v·

(1972) 1 All ER 462 at p. 474..
Non-exercise of discretionary powers did not arise in Dutton's case, but the judgment of Sachs, 1,
mentions that "failure to inspect the foundations at all might according to the circumstances have
constituted negligence".
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decision allowed a remedy in respect of a threatened
hitherto no action lay in tort.

structure

faaure,

213
for which

The majority view in Dutton's case was subsequently endorsed by the House of
Lords in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council,20 again a case of defective
foundations. The facts are more or less similar to Dutton. The builder in this case,
obtained the approval of their building plans for the construction of certain flats from
the local authority ('the Council') as provided for under the building bye-laws. When
the foundations were ready, the Council had the power to inspect and to insist on any
corrections necessary to bring the work into conformity with the bye-laws, but were
not under any obligation to inspect the foundations. On completion of the flats in
1962, the builder who was also the owner, leased out the flats to the plaintiff. In 1970
structural movements began to occur resulting in cracks in the walls, sloping of floors
and other defects. The plaintiff claimed damages from the builder and the Council on
the ground that the fiats were ~uilt on inadequate foundations.
The plaintiffs case was that under the building bye-laws, the Council was under
a duty to ensure that the building was constructed in accordance with the plans and
therefore the building should have been inspected before the foundations. were
covered; but the Council's servants were negligent in approving the fouijdations
and/or in failing to inspect it. Thus, the plaintiff in this case, unlike in Dutton, relied
not only on negligent inspection but in the alternative on failure to make any
inspection.
The House of Lords observed that although the 1936 Act and the bye-laws did
not impose a duty on the Council to inspect the foundation, it did not follow that a
failure to inspect could not constitute a breach of the duty of care; it was the duty of
the Council to give proper consideration of the question whether they should inspect
or not. The question whether the Council was under a duty of care towards the
plaintiff had to be considered in relation to the duties, powers and discretions arising
under the Public Health Act, 1936. The court emphasised on the fact that local
authorities were public bodies operating under statute and that they must make their
discretionary decisions responsibly and for reasons which accorded with statutory
purpose. As to the liability of the local authority, the court said:
"It must be in the reasonable contemplation not only of the builder, but also
of the local authority that failure to comply with the bye-laws' requirements
as to foundations might give rise to a hidden defect which in future may cause
damage to the building affecting the safety and health of owners and
occupiers. And as the building was intended to last, the class of owners and
occupiers likely to be affected cannot be limited to those who go in
immediately after construction.,,21
Applying the decision in Dutton, the court held that the Council would be liable
to the plaintiff if it were proved that, in failing to carry out an inspection, it had not
properly exercised its discretion and had failed to exercise reasonable care to secure
that the bye-laws were complied with, or that the inspector having assumed the duty
20.
21.

(1977) 2 All ER 492.
Ibid.
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of inspecting the foundations had failed to take reasonable care to ensure their
compliance. As to the damages recoverable, the court reiterated the view in Dutton
that it would not only include damages for personal injury and damage to property,
but also damage to the dwelIinghouse itself,
"for the whole purpose of the bye-laws in requiring foundations to be of
certain standard is to prevent damage arising from weakness of the
foundations which is certain to endanger the health or safety of occupants,"
and that, ,
"the relevant damage to the house is physiCal damage, and what is
recoverable is the ,amount of expenditure necessary to restore thy d~~1lingto
a condition inwbich it is no longer a danger to the health or safety of persons
occupying it and possibly (depending on the circumstances) expenses arising
from necessary displacement.,,22
Holding that the action was not barred' by limitation, as contended by the
Council, the court observed that the cause of action would accrue on the date 'when
the state of the building became such that there was present or imminent danger to
the health and safety of persons occupying it.
Still later, the decision in Ann's case was applied in Acrecrest Ltd. v.' Hattrell &
Partners,23 again a case of defective foundations. Here, the flats and garages built by
the builders and architects employed by the plaintiff, were let by the plaintiffs to
tenants on long leases. Later, cracks began to appear in the buildings because of
defective foundations. The plaintiffs claimed damages from the architects for
negligence and breach of contract and the architects claimed contrib~tion from the
local authority on the ground that the foundations were laid in accordance with and
because of the requirements of the local authority's inspector. The court held that
there was a sufficient causal link between the building inspector's negligence and the'
damage to the plaintiff for the architects, who were liable to the plaintiff for the same
damage, to be entitled to a contribution from the local authority. Relying on Dutton
and Anns the court held that a local authority when exercising its statutory power to
inspect the foundations of a building to ensure that they complied with the building
regulations, owed a duty of care to an owner who employed builders to build a
building, provided the owner's negligence was not the source of his own 10ss24and
such duty was the same as that owed by the local authority to future owners and
existing and future occupiers. The court pointed out that the safety of buildin~ was a
shared responsibility of architects, builders and local authorities and justice demanded
22.
23.
24.

(1977) 2 All ER 492.
(1982) 1 All ER 17 (CA).
However, in Investors in Industrial Commercial Properties Ltd. v. South Bedfordshire District Council
.(1986) 1 All ER 787 (CA), the court held that "a local authority owed no duty Ofcare to-aIHlriginal
building owner who, although, not personally careless hall, lteVertheJess, acted in breach of the
building regulations in reliance on th~ professional advice of architects. engineers or contractors.
Since the plaintiffs were the original building owners and albeit in reliance on the structural
engineers, were themselves in breach of the building regulatj9Ds in erecting the warehouses with
defective foundations, they were owed no duty of care by the Council to ensure that the warehouses complied with regulations, even though the Council itself had been at fault in approving the'
design of the fOundations.II
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that owners, as well as occupiers should have a claim against any of them who was
proved negligent.
The novel claim for negligence made against local authorities and its acceptance
by the .Court of Appeal in Dutton and later by the House of LOrds inAnns resulting in
the fIxing of liability on local authorities for defective houses were subject to a host of
criticisms. It was pointed out that though the decision in Ann's case was wellintentioned "the damage it has done to society and the law is immense",2S and
suggested that the House of Lords should use its powers to admit its error "to
abandon this disastrous line of jurisprudence and to hold that in the absence of a very
special relationship no one owes anyone else a .duty to stop a third party causing him
to waste his money".26It was further argued that "the courts which decided Dutton
and Anns seem t9 have been lacking in reasonable foresight as well as reasonable
care", on the ground that the optimism expressed by Lord Denning in DuttonZ7 and
Lord Simon in Annl.8 that it would not lead to any flood of litigation is not the
experience of some local authorities".29
The fact that 'some local authorities' had to face litigation after Anns, does not
indicate that there was a 'flood of litigation', nor does it substantiate the argument
that the courts were lacking in 'reasonable foresight' or 'reasonable care'. The
observation made by Woolf, J, in Warloceo that "
all authorities engaged in
supervising compliance with the building regulations
adopt a much more stringent
.approach than they· adopted before the AmlS decision declared what the
responsibilities of inspectors in relation to these matters were", is a welcome trend as
it ensures proper supervision of building works and effective enforcement of building
regulations by local authorities and their servants and should be viewed_as a salutary
aftermath of the decision.
The criticism against Acrecrest's case was that "the Court of Appeal has been
pleased to hold that the developer of a site (i.e. a money-grubbing fInancier lurking,
behind a corporate facade) can sue. the local authority (i.e. honest citizens who pay
rates) if the inspector did not go quite far enough in correcting the incompetence of
the developer's own architect,"3!and that "this is arrant foolishness which puts up the
cost of building as well as the rates and which... profits only lawyers.,,32Does this
mean that a local authority should never be sued even for the negligent performance
of their duties resulting in damages, because they are 'honest citizens who pay rates'?
What the court had held in Acrecrest was that the local authority owed a duty of care
to an owner (developer), provided the owner's negligencewas not the source of his own
loss. It may also be pointed out that the court has further clarifIed the position in
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Tony Weir, A Casebook on Tort, Sweet & Maxwell. London, 1983,p. 63.
/bid.
"To impose liability on the Council would not adversely affect the work of building inspection and
to permit this new type of Claim in negligence would' not in practice lead to a flood of cases which
neither the local authority nor the courts could handle", (1972) 1 All ER 462,475.
"I do not think that there is any danger that the responsibility which.... lies on the Council is likely
to lead to any flood of litigation." (978) AC 728,767.
Lawton, U, in Denhis v. Cham wood Borough Council (1982) 3 All ER 486, 495.
Warlock v Saws, June 19, 1981 cited by Tony Weir.
Tony Weir, A Casebook on Tort, Sweet & MaxWell,London, 1983.
Ibid.
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Investors in Industrial Commercial Properties,33 case that the iocal authority owed no

duty of care to,an original building owner (developer) who, although, not personally
careless had, nevertheless, acted in breach of the building regulations in reliance on
the professional advice of architects, engineers or contractors.34
Dutton and Anns decisions have highlighted the importance of the need for
effective enforcement of building regulations which confer control over building
activities and the way they are done, by local authorities. They have also laid emphasis
on the obligation on the part of local authorities to make their discretionary decisions
under building bye-laws responsibly in view of the fact that they are public bodies
discharging statutory functions, as the non-exercise or negligent exercise of their
discretion might result in damages to the subsequent purchaser of a house with
hidden defects which might manifest themselves much later.
As in England, the local authorities in India such as municipal corporations,
municipalities and development authorities involved in building activities, have their
building bye-laws specifying the standards relating to the structural safety of the
buildings, which are considered necessary to protect the health and safety of the
individuals and that of the general public and are vested with the responsibility for
their enforcement.
The principle enunciated in Dutton and AlIIlS are squarely applicable to the local
authorities in India especially to those involved in building activities such as for
instance, Delhi Development Authority (DDA), and are as much liable in damages
for defective constructions as private builders, both in contract and in tort. Seepage
and cracks in the walls, loose plaster, defective doors and windows and uneven floors
are common features of the houses/flats built by these authorities. There have been
cases of sinking flats because of defective foundations also.35 Under the principles of
Dutton and Anns, it is doubtful whether these authorities can escape liability for
negligent construction by a contractual disclaimer in the allotment order36 as is
normally done by some of these authorities, for hidden defects which manifest
themselves later. Similarly, the sale of houses/flats on 'as is where is' basis may not
help the authority, as it will apply only to the defects known to the purchaser and not
to hidden defects.

* * * *

33.

Investors in Industrial Commercial

Properties Ltd. v. South Bedfordshire District Council (1986) 1 All

ER 787 (CA).
34.
35.

36.

Ibid.

"The DDA has now started playing with human lives, Times of India said Febluary 22. Its 306 flats
constructed just a few years ago at Kalkaji Extension are constantly sinking, perhaps because of
weak or just no foundation at ail". Quoted in Data India (1987).
"The property is being offered on 'as is where is basis'. The DDA will not entc;rtain any request for
addition and alteration or any complaint whatsoever regarding property circu.mstances as defined in
para 19 of the ResulatiQn~ (DDA MlIollKI<ml<ot & Di6po6al of Housing Estate Regulations, 1968)
or about the design, quality of material used, workmanship or any other defect." Allotment Order
under Self-Financing Scheme issued by DDA to allotters.

